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Too much R&D? – vertical
differentiation and monopolistic
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Jan Kranich
Leibniz University of Hannover, Hannover, Germany
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to discuss whether product research and development (R&D) in
developed economies tends to be too high compared with the socially desired level.
Design/methodology/approach – In this context, a model of vertical and horizontal product
differentiation within the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of monopolistic competition is set up. Firms
compete in horizontal attributes of their products, and also in quality that can be controlled by R&D
investments.
Findings – The paper reveals that in monopolistic-competitive industries, R&D intensity is
positively correlated with market concentration. Furthermore, welfare and policy analysis
demonstrate an overinvestment in R&D with the result that vertical differentiation is too high and
horizontal differentiation is too low. The only effective policy instrument in order to contain welfare
losses is a price control of R&D services.
Originality/value – Considering the extent of product R&D as well as the political efforts to
promote public and private research, this paper scrutinizes its benefit incorporating income and
employment effects. Thus, it goes beyond partial-analytical models of the existing industrial
organization literature and provides a larger base of political analysis.
Keywords Research and development, Monopolies, Competitive strategy, Product design
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Based on the results of the Fourth Community Innovation Survey (CIS4) conducted by
the European Statistical Office, in 2004 about 40 percent of European firms, which
account for more than 260,000 enterprises, undertook research activities for developing
new products and technologies, and for improving existing products and processes,
respectively. In this regard, they spent more than e222 billion[1]. With regard to the
nature of research and development (R&D), more than 53 percent of the firms invest in
product and about 47 percent in process innovation[2].
Against the background of empirical facts, this paper poses the question: Is the
extent of product R&D in developed markets on a socially optimal level? Furthermore,
in consideration of intensive policy efforts to expand private and public research
activities (in the European Union within the scope of the Lisbon Strategy, for instance),
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a central concern is to discuss whether a categorical research promotion is consistent
with welfare maximizing policy objectives.
Based on these leading questions, an adequate modeling approach needs to meet a
few requirements. First, for analyzing the allocation from a macroeconomic point of
view, a general equilibrium framework is required to incorporate not only income and
employment effects, but also a tax base for political intervention. Second, for
implementing product R&D, the model needs to include endogenous quality and R&D
decisions of firms. Third, for the sake of analytical simplicity, the modeling set up
should produce a closed and stable solution set avoiding corner solutions and case
differentiations.
In this context, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) provided a powerful tool for modeling
macroeconomic aggregates – the beginning of the “second monopolistic revolution,” as
contemplated by Brakman and Heijdra (2004). Since this pioneering work, the concept
of monopolistic competition has enjoyed great popularity and has penetrated different
fields of research. Basic models of international trade utilize the monopolistically
competitive framework (e.g. Krugman (1979, 1980); Dixit and Norman, 1980), as well as
fundamental contributions within the endogenous growth literature (e.g. Romer, 1987,
1990; Lucas, 1988).
An essential attribute in models of monopolistic competition is horizontal product
differentiation, as described by Hotelling (1929) and advanced by Chamberlin (1933)[3].
Beside differentiation in terms of product characteristics (e.g. design, color or taste),
newer literature considers quality as an additional vertical dimension of product
space[4]. The corresponding branch of industrial organization was originated by
Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1987) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980).
Following the classification of Sutton (1991), Schmalensee (1992) distinguished Type 1
and Type 2 industries. While a Type 1 industry is characterized by horizontally
differentiated (or homogenous) products, Type 2 firms compete not only in price and
horizontal product attributes, but also in perceived quality. In this context, quality is
influenced by R&D expenditures, so that a firm may increase its market share by
increasing the quality of its product.
In this paper we implement endogenous quality and R&D in the seminal model of
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and analyze both vertical and horizontal product
differentiation. In order to meet the demands discussed above, we set up a model
with three sectors:
(1) a traditional constant-return sector producing a homogenous product;
(2) a monopolistic-competitive sector producing a continuum of cross-
differentiated consumer products; and
(3) a separate R&D sector.
Whereas horizontal differentiation is a result of consumer’s love of diversity and fixed
production costs, vertical differentiation results from R&D investments of
manufacturing firms. The R&D sector receives corresponding expenditures from the
manufacturing industry, and in turn, providing quality improving R&D services.
Owing to the general equilibrium setting, private households consume both types of
goods, and they also provide the required labor input for this economy. The entire
labor force splits up in two factor groups: production workers employed in the
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traditional and manufacturing sectors, and highly skilled labor, e.g. scientists,
engineers, etc., exclusively engaged in the R&D sector.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. Section 3
analyzes the existence and stability of the equilibrium. In this context, the
interdependencies that exist between quality and market concentration turn out to be
the central adjustment mechanism in this model. Based on the first-best optimum as a
reference for political intervention, Section 4 considers three basic policy instruments:
(1) price control of R&D services;
(2) taxation/subsidization on R&D expenditures; and
(3) a regulation of the technological potential.
Finally, Section 5 presents a concluding discussion of the main findings and their
practical implications.
2. The model
Private demand
Private households consume two types of goods:
(1) a homogenous good A produced by a Walrasian constant-return sector (often
described as an agricultural sector or an outside industry); and
(2) differentiated industrial products provided by a manufacturing sector.
Consumer preferences follow a nested utility function of the form:
U ¼ M mA 12m; ð1Þ
where M denotes a concave subutility from the consumption of the continuum of n
(potential) industrial goods[5]:
M ¼
Xn
i¼1
uið Þ1=s xið Þ s21ð Þ=s
" #
s
s2 1
; s . 1; ui . 0: ð2Þ
While xi is the quantity consumed of variety i, ui denotes a product-specific utility
parameter, henceforth labeled product quality, and s is the constant substitution
elasticity between varieties[6]. Applying two-stage budgeting, we obtain the demand
function for a representative industrial product sort:
xD ¼ mYup2sP s21; ð3Þ
where mY represents the share in household income for industrial products, and p the
market price. Further on, P is the price-quality index defined to be:
P ¼
Xn
i¼1
ui pið Þ12s
" # 1
12s
: ð4Þ
From equation (3) it can be seen that the elasticity of demand in terms of quantity is s,
and in terms of quality, it is 1. The price-quality index contains information about
product quality as a result of its being the minimum cost for a given subutility M. The
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demand increases linearly with respect to rising product quality, which results from
the constant substitution elasticity. Henceforth, we assume symmetric varieties so that
the price-quality index becomes: P ¼ pðnuÞ12s.
Industrial supply
Turning to the supply side of this model, the production of a particular variety requires
labor as the only input. The corresponding factor requirement is characterized by a
fixed and variable cost:
l M ¼ F þ ax; ð5Þ
where M is mnemonic for manufacturing. Because of economies of scale and consumer
preference for diversity, it is profitable for each firm to produce only one differentiated
variety, so that the firm number is equal to the number of available product sorts.
Furthermore, each variety is characterized by a certain level of product quality,
which can be controlled by research investments of manufacturing firms according to
Sutton (1991). This implies that consumer products do not only differ in terms of
horizontal attributes, such as color, taste or design, but also in terms of quality as
another dimension of the differentiation space, which is also referred to as vertical
product differentiation. In contrast to the original Dixit-Stiglitz framework, which
incorporates horizontal differentiation only, firms now have a further degree of
freedom to build up a monopolistic scope.
Attaining and maintaining a certain level of quality requires research expenditures
given by:
R uð Þ ¼ r
g
ug ; g . 1: ð6Þ
The parameter, r, represents a constant cost rate and g the research elasticity. The
research expenditure function shows a convex, deterministic relation implying that it
requires more and more research investments to increase product quality. Finally,
research is assumed to be indispensable, because, otherwise, product quality and thus
demand become zero[7].
In consideration of production and research, the profit function of a manufacturing
firm is given by:
p ¼ px2 R2 wF 2 wax; ð7Þ
where w denotes an exogenous wage rate. From profit maximization follows the
price-setting rule:
p* ¼ s
s2 1
 
aw; ð8Þ
where the term in brackets is the monopolistic price mark-up on top of marginal
production cost. For analytical convenience, we normalize the variable production
coefficient, a, by ðs2 1Þ=s, so that the profit maximizing price becomes w.
The optimum research policy follows from the first derivative of the profit function
with respect to quality:
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mYup2sP s21 p2 wað Þ ¼ rug: ð9Þ
The term on the right-hand side of (9) represents the average change in research costs
in consequence of a change in quality, whereas the left-hand side shows the
corresponding increase of the operating profit (profit less research costs). The optimum
quality is:
u* ¼ mYw
12sP s21
sr
  1
g21
: ð10Þ
From equation (10), it can be concluded:
P1. The firm’s choice of quality depends upon the research cost rate and the
degree of competition.
The higher the cost rate, r, the lower is the product quality due to the optimum rule in
(9). Decreasing competitive pressure may result from an increase of market size, a
lower substitution elasticity, or a higher profit maximizing price. In this case, firms
compete in quality rather than in prices. In other words, firms expand their research
activities as the degree of competition decreases.
Furthermore, we obtain central information on the interdependency between market
concentration (measured in number of firms) and research expenditures:
P2. Via the price-index effect, product quality and the corresponding research
expenditures are negatively correlated with the manufacturing firm number.
This becomes apparent by substituting the price index into equation (10):
u* ¼ mY
srn
 1
g
) R* ¼ mY
sgn
: ð11Þ
The firm behavior, in terms of firm number and quality, affects demand via the
price-quality index. In case of an increasing firm number, the price index declines, and
thus, the demand for a particular variety. In consequence, the capacity of firms to
finance R&D investments decreases, which in turn leads to a reduction of product
quality.
Long run equilibrium
In the long run, the equilibrium is characterized by free market entry and exit, and
thus, a variable firm number. From the zero-profit condition, we obtain the equilibrium
output of each firm:
x* ¼ s R
*
w
þ F
 
¼ mY
gwn
þ sF: ð12Þ
Compared to the original Dixit-Stiglitz outcome, which is simply sF, the firm size in
this model is larger, and the equilibrium output depends not only on exogenous
parameters, but also on the endogenous research expenditures.
Too much R&D?
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From (12), we can also derive the equilibrium labor input:
l M
 *¼ F þ ax* ¼ sF þ s2 1
s
 
mY
gwn
: ð13Þ
Finally, the equilibrium firm number comes from the market clearing condition:
mY ¼ p*x*n*:
n* ¼ mY
sF
g2 1
g
 
: ð14Þ
General equilibrium
Considering the model from a macroeconomic point of view, we adopt a simple general
equilibrium framework. To internalize wages and income, we introduce a separate
R&D sector receiving the corresponding expenditures of the manufacturing industry.
We assume a linear constant-return technology, where one unit of R&D requires one
unit of scientific input (e.g. research staff)[8].
The production labor force is employed in the traditional and the manufacturing
sectors, whereas it is assumed to be intersectorally mobile. In the traditional sector, the
labor is used within a linear technology in which one unit of labor generates one unit of
output. The factor demand of the manufacturing sector follows equation (13).
In the long run, the GDP of the economy consists of the labor income in the
manufacturing and the constant-return sectors plus the earnings of the R&D sector
(manufacturing profits are zero). Because the homogenous good is the numeraire, the
corresponding price is set to 1. Hence, the income of private households is given by:
Y ¼ wLM þ LA þ nR; ð15Þ
where L M denotes the manufacturing employment, and L A the agricultural workforce.
Normalizing the entire production labor force, L ¼ LM þ LA, with 1, the household
income becomes: Y ¼ wþ nR.
We assume an inelastic labor supply, whereas the manufacturing wage comes from
the zero-profit condition, which determines the level of prices and thus of wages at
which manufacturing firms break even. This wage rate can be derived by solving
equation (3) for the price, p, and using the price setting rule (8):
w* ¼ mYuP
s21
x*
 1
s
: ð16Þ
Thus, equation (16) implies the simultaneous clearing of the labor and consumer
product markets. Due to intersectoral labor mobility, the equilibrium wage rates
equalize in both sectors at w ¼ 1, so that the household income is given by
Y ¼ 1 þ nR.
Turning to the R&D sector, the cost rate, r, results from the market equilibrium of
research services: rLR ¼ nR. The supply of R&D is assumed to be fixed and
price-inelastic, which conveys the idea of (a state-controlled) technological potential or
an innovation frontier of this economy. Using equation (11) and setting the total supply
of R&D services, LR , equal to 1, the research cost rate fulfills:
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r ¼ mY
sg
: ð17Þ
Equation (17) implies that the cost rate of R&D services, r, decreases with a rising
research cost elasticity, g, and increases with an increasing market size, mY, and a
decreasing homogeneity of consumer products, s. Whereas the first result is
self-explanatory, the second comes from the firm’s quality policy given by equation
(10), which states that the research expenditures increase with a lower degree of
competition.
3. Equilibrium and stability
Finally, by use of equations (14) and (17), the household income can be expressed as:
Y * ¼ sg
sg2 m
: ð18Þ
Substituting this expression with the price index and the equilibrium output (12) into
the wage equation (16), we obtain for the firm number:
n* ¼ m
F
g2 1
sg2 m
 
: ð19Þ
Using this expression, the equilibrium firm size can be expressed as:
x* ¼ sF g
g2 1
 
: ð20Þ
For the equilibrium rate of research services, we obtain:
r* ¼ m
sg2 m
; ð21Þ
so that product quality and research expenditures become:
u* ¼ F
m
g sg2 m
 
g2 1
  1
g
ð22Þ
R* ¼ F
g2 1
: ð23Þ
From equations (19) and (23) follows:
P3. In consequence of fixed firm size, the equilibrium research expenditures are
constant with respect to fixed production costs and the research cost
elasticity.
From (20) it becomes apparent that the equilibrium firm size depends upon exogenous
parameters, as it is a characteristic result of the the Dixit-Stiglitz settings[9]. Because of
this scale invariance, the sales revenues and thus the financial base for R&D
investments is also constant, which in turn leads to a constant product quality.
Too much R&D?
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For considering the relation between the central endogenous variables, quality and
firm number, equation (11) can with equations (18) and (21) be expressed as:
u ¼ g
n
 1
g
: ð24Þ
As demonstrated in P2, the lower the firm number, the higher the research
expenditures and product quality. Furthermore, equation (24) represents research
market clearing, which can be seen by rearranging to: nðug=gÞ ¼ 1ð¼ LRÞ.
The opposite relationship can be derived from the manufacturing market clearing
condition: mY ¼ n*p*x*. The firm number with respect to quality is given by:
n ¼ mg g2 1
 
sg2 m
 
g 2sF sg2 m
 
2 m2 g2 1
 
ug
: ð25Þ
P4. The manufacturing firm number positively depends upon the level of product
quality.
The simple market size argument indicates that the higher the quality, the higher the
R&D expenditures, and thus, the corresponding proportion of household income. This
leads to an increase in market size and new firm entries[10].
The interaction between equations (24) and (25) is displayed in the lower part of
Figure 1 for a representative numerical example (parameter settings: s ¼ 2, g ¼ 2,
F ¼ 1, and m ¼ 0:2). Both curves represent the clearing of the research and
manufacturing markets, whereas the intersection of both curves indicates the
equilibrium firm number and product quality.
Based on these results, we can state the following proposition:
P5. There exists a unique, positive and globally stable equilibrium.
Whereas the existence of the equilibrium directly follows from equations (18)-(23), the
stability can be proven by assuming an out of equilibrium adjustment process:
_n ¼ f ðpÞ, f ð0Þ ¼ 0, f 0 . 0[11].
Totally differentiating the profit function yields:
dp ¼ p
s
dxþ m g2 1
 
sg2 m
ug21
 
du
u
: ð26Þ
As apparent, firm profits respond only to changes in demand and quality, while they
are not affected by prices due to the price-setting rule. An increase in demand always
gives rise to profits, and thus, to market entry of new firms. The same applies with a
quality improvement. This dependency becomes apparent by expressing the profit
function with respect to quality only:
p ¼ g2 1
g
 
rug 2 wF: ð27Þ
For illustration, the upper diagram in Figure 1 shows the profit function (27).
According to the total differential (26), an increase in product quality out of the
equilibrium makes profits become positive due to an increase in demand. This leads to
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market entries of new firms. However, as given by equation (24) and P2, respectively,
an increasing firm number is accompanied by decreasing R&D investments, and thus,
a reduction of product quality down to the equilibrium level again[12]. Hence, the
equilibrium has been proved to be globally stable, also indicated by the directional
arrows in Figure 1.
Finally, the mutual interdependencies between firm number and quality comply
with the results of Sutton (1998):
P6. An increasing market concentration of industries accompanies a high R&D
intensity. In the equilibrium, the R&D intensity increases with an increasing
horizontal differentiation and decreasing costliness of research activities.
Figure 1.
Quality and firm number
Too much R&D?
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This outcome can be shown by use of equations (11), (18)-(20):
R
px
¼ m g2 1
 
sFg sg2 m
 
n
¼ 1
sg
: ð28Þ
In equation (28), R&D intensity is given by the ratio of R&D expenditures to turnover,
and, as apparent, it is negatively correlated with the firm number. Furthermore, in the
equilibrium, this ratio only depends on substitution and research elasticity.
4. Welfare and policy analysis
With respect to the allocation outcome in imperfect markets and the basic question of
this paper, this section considers R&D policy instruments and their efficiency in terms
of social welfare. First, we determine the first-best optimum as a reference to the cases
in which public institutions are in position to: regulate the price for R&D
services;impose a tax/subsidy on R&D expenditures; and control the technological
potential.
First-best optimum
For considering the product quality as the central concern of this paper, we need to
determine the socially optimal degree of vertical differentiation.
The optimization problem of a social planner is to maximize household utility
subject to technological and resource constraints[13]:
ðM ;A;n;uÞmaxU ¼ M
mA 12m s:t:LM ¼ Aþ n F þ axð Þ; LR ¼ n
g
ug: ð29Þ
From the first-order conditions, we obtain a firm size, which is the same as in the
equilibrium (20). In contrast, the socially optimal firm number and quality differ[14].
n* ¼ m g2 1
 
F g s2 1ð Þ þ m g2 1 	 
 . ne ð30Þ
u* ¼ g
g2 1
 
F
m
g s2 1ð Þ þ m g2 1   1g, ue ð31Þ
From these equations follows:
P7. While the first-best firm size complies with the equilibrium firm size, the
socially optimal quality is lower, and thus, the socially optimal number of
varieties is higher than the laissez-faire equilibrium.
This results from the monopolistic scope of manufacturing firms. Because prices are
set above marginal costs, firms overinvest their additional revenues in R&D to further
increase demand. As a consequence of P2, if the equilibrium quality is too high, the
firm number is too low[15]. The equilibrium welfare is[16]:
W e ¼ g ms21 sg
sg2 m
 
m
F
g
g2 1
 
1
sg2 m
  m g21ð Þ
g s21ð Þ
: ð32Þ
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From these results it can be concluded that setting minimum quality standards would
miss the welfare maximum, whereas maximum standards are not practicable.
Optimal control of research costs
With regards to the unconstrained optimum discussed above, there are lifelike more
constraints for real economic policy. Deviating from the social planner approach, we
now consider a constrained optimum, where policymakers are restricted in their
instruments.
We assume that the state can control the research cost rate, which may be motivated
by a publicly owned/-regulated R&D sector. The argument for public intervention is
the failure not of the competitive research market itself, but rather of the corresponding
downstream sector.
In consideration of the inelastic supply of R&D services, the choice of a research
cost rate is linked with excess supply or demand, so that case differentiation is required
for the derivation of the welfare function.
First, we consider a cost rate above the equilibrium value, so that the demand for
R&D becomes the limiting factor. While household income, firm number, and firm size
remain constant, quality decreases due to the firm’s policy. Although research
investments do not change, employment in the R&D sector declines. The welfare
function with respect to the research cost rate can be expressed as:
W r . r*
  ¼ sg
sg2 m
 
Fg
g2 1
 
m g2 1
 
F sg2 m
 
" # m
s21
r
m
g 12sð Þ: ð33Þ
The terms in square brackets are positive: the welfare decreases monotonically with
increasing cost rate so that a scale-up of r leads always to welfare losses.
If the cost rate is set below the equilibrium value, the demand for R&D services is
larger than the market capacity. Consequently, quality becomes:
u ¼ gsF
m2 r s2 m
 
" #1
g
; ð34Þ
The welfare function is now:
W r , r*
  ¼ 1 þ rð Þg mg s21ð Þ m 1 þ rð Þ2 rs
sF
 m g21ð Þ
g s21ð Þ
: ð35Þ
The limiting values of equation (35) are ðm=sFÞmðg21Þ=gðs21Þ for r! 0 and 21 for
r!1[17]. From (35), the welfare maximizing research cost rate is:
rmax ¼ m m g2 1
 þ s2 g	 

s g s2 1ð Þ2 m	 
þ m g2 m g2 1 	 
 , r e: ð36Þ
If we do not allow for negative values of (36), the socially optimal research cost rate is
defined as:
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r** ¼
rmax;g ,
s2m
12m
0;g . s2m12m
8<
: ð37Þ
From this outcome it can be concluded:
P8. The second-best research cost rate, r* *, is always lower than the equilibrium
value, r e. The corresponding second-best quality and firm number are equal
to the first-best values but implying a lower welfare level:
W * . W ** .W e.
If we complete the welfare function for the whole range of r, we must consider both
equations (33) and (35). The graphs intersect at their lower and upper limits: the
non-regulated equilibrium r e. Thus, we obtain a continuous but non-differentiable
welfare function. Figure 2 depicts the socially optimal and unregulated research cost
rate and the corresponding welfare values for the same parameter values as in Figure 1.
The welfare statement of P8 can be proved as follows. The firm size with respect to
quality and research cost rate is:
x ¼ s r
g
ug þ sF: ð38Þ
Accordingly, the firm number can be expressed as:
n ¼ m
r**
g u
g s2 m
 þ sF : ð39Þ
From the research market clearing condition we obtain: 1 ¼ n=gug. Substituting
equation (39) and solving for the research cost rate yields:
u** ¼ sgF
r** s2 m
 
2 m
 !1=g
ð40Þ
Figure 2.
Research cost rate and
welfare
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From equations (39) and (40) it can easily be derived that u* ¼ u** and n* ¼ n**. The
difference between first-best and second-best allocation is the manufacturing output
given by equation (38). Because r** , r e ¼ r*, x** , x* ¼ xe. This leads to lower
economies of scale, and thus, to a lower welfare level of the second-best solution
compared to the first-best[18].
Including a tax to finance the research price reduction, leads to exactly the same
results. The subsidized research price becomes: r ¼ r e 2 t, where t is a non-negative
transfer to R&D firms. In turn, private households pay a lump-sum tax on income:
Y ¼ 12 tþ r e. Solving the model via the clearing condition of the R&D market yields
a firm number and quality on the first-best levels given by equations (30) and (31). The
corresponding welfare function with respect to the research subsidy is:
W tð Þ ¼ g mg s21ð Þ sg 12 tð Þ þ mt
sg2 m
 
sm g2 1
 þ t sg2 m  s2 m 
sF sg2 m
 
" #m g21ð Þ
g s21ð Þ
: ð41Þ
Figure 3 shows the welfare function (41).For t ¼ 0, the welfare takes the equilibrium
value and becomes 0, if the maximum tax base is totally exhausted: t ¼ Y e.
Maximization leads to the second best subsidy level:
t** ¼ g2 1
sg2 m
 
msg
s2 m
 
12 m
m g2 1
 þ g s2 1ð Þ
 !
; ð42Þ
which corresponds with the research policy (37).
However, it is a noteworthy fact that reducing quality to the optimum level is only
realizable by a reduction/subsidization of the research market price. This seems to be
contrary to intuition and partial analytical results. In general, this dependency can be
traced back to the disequilibrium in the research market. The decreasing research cost
Figure 3.
Second-best R&D subsidy
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rate increases demand for R&D services. Because the supply is fixed and inelastic, the
limited research output is rationed to the number of manufacturing firms. In
consequence, the quality remains unchanged, whereas the research investments, and
thus the fixed costs, decline, which makes firm profits become positive and new firms
enter the market. Because of equations (24) and (38), the quality and firm size decrease
to the (constrained) optimum level.
R&D tax/subsidy
Based on the results above, it may be a political option to raise a tax on R&D
expenditures. Thus, the firm’s profit function becomes:
p ¼ px2 awx2 wF 2 R2 tR; ð43Þ
where t is a tax rate with respect to the R&D expenditures. At the first stage, the firms
decrease their quality and R&D investments, whereas the price setting given by
equation (8) holds. However, the supply of R&D is fixed and totally employed so that a
reduction in demand leads to reduction of the research price and the corresponding
income of R&D suppliers. Overall, the market size decreases, and thus, the number of
firms, whereas the quality remains on the equilibrium level. This implies a reduction of
social welfare.If we assume for simplicity that the tax is used to pay a lump-sum grant
for consumers, Y ¼ 1 þ ntR þ nR, the market size is constant because of a 1:1 transfer
between households. The overall effect is a decrease of the equilibrium research cost
rate only, while the income, firm number and quality remain on the equilibrium values.
In conclusion, this policy instrument turns out to be non-effective[19].
Technological potential
An alternative policy instrument exists in the control of the supply of R&D services
and scientific personnel. In the first stage, we neglect the financing of public market
intervention, but rather consider the impact on allocation and welfare.
In Section 2, we set the supply of R&D equal to 1. Here we relax this restriction and
allow L R to be non-zero positive. As a result, the equilibrium research cost rate
becomes:
r* ¼ m
LR sg2 m
  ; ð44Þ
where income remains constant at (18). The equilibrium quality can now be expressed
as:
u* ¼ FL
Rg sg2 m
 
m g2 1
 
" #1
g
ð45Þ
As a result of the price inelasticity, an increase in the research supply allows firms to
improve the quality without increasing their research investments. In consequence,
market concentration and firm size remain unchanged. If the firm number is constant
with increasing quality, the price index declines, ultimately increasing real income and
welfare. In summation, these results imply:
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P9. An increase in R&D supply leads to a higher quality with unaffected market
concentration. However, this policy increases social welfare, but it always
fails to meet the welfare maximum.
In the next step, we assume that the technological potential can be expanded by public
expenditures financed by a lump-sum tax on household income. Up to now, the model
was subject to a linear relationship of scientific work input and research output.
Relaxing this restriction, market clearing requires:
LR ¼ a n
g
ug; ð46Þ
where a denotes a productivity parameter in the production of R&D services. This
technological capacity can be controlled by public expenditures given by:
a tð Þ ¼ 1 þ tð Þb; 0 , b , 1: ð47Þ
Accordingly, household income is:
Y ¼ 1 þ nR2 t ; 0 , t , 1: ð48Þ
From these settings follows that firm size and R&D expenditures are on the
laissez-faire equilibrium level, whereas product quality and firm number become:
n ¼ m
F
g2 1
sg2 m
 
12 tð Þ , ne ð49Þ
u ¼ F
m
sg2 m
a 12 tð Þ
 
g
g2 1
  1
g
. ue: ð50Þ
From equations (49) and (50) it can be seen that for t . 0 the firm number is lower and
the product quality is higher compared with the unregulated results. This leads us to
the conclusions:
P10. A publicly financed enhancement of product R&D capacities corresponds
with a loss of social welfare in comparison with the laissez-faire, and thus, also
with the first-best and second-best solution.
The welfare function with respect to the tax rate is given by:
W ¼ 1 þ tð Þ mbg 12sð ÞW e ,W e: ð51Þ
Figure 4 plots this function for the standard numerical example.
From equation (51) follows a monotonic decreasing function, where W t ¼ 0ð Þ ¼
W e and W t ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 0.
5. Conclusions
The welfare and policy analysis pointed out that in economies with
monopolistic-competitive industries, the degree of vertical differentiation, and thus
the extent of product R&D, is higher than the socially optimum level. Furthermore, the
Too much R&D?
655
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 T
ec
hn
isc
he
 In
fo
rm
at
io
ns
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 (T
IB
) A
t 0
1:1
1 0
2 F
eb
rua
ry 
20
18
 (P
T)
horizontal product diversity is too low, which is primarily a result of too few
manufacturing firms and a consequently higher price index.
As the paper reveals, the only effective policy instrument to contain welfare losses
to the second-best optimum is to regulate the market price within the research sector.
The basic idea is to generate a disequilibrium in the R&D market, and thus, to decrease
the level of a firm’s R&D expenditures by a rationing process. As demonstrated, this
outcome critically depends upon the assumption of a fixed and price-inelastic R&D
supply here conveying the idea of a technological potential. Relaxing this assumption
would also make the research subsidization of manufacturing firms become efficient.
However political intervention is realized, a public technology promotion in terms of
product R&D has been shown to be the wrong way.
Hence, the efficiency of real economic policy requires a differentiated consideration.
A categorical promotion of private or public R&D has to be questioned according to the
nature on innovation and its impact on social welfare. Practically, policy efforts
encounter some problems. Oftentimes a clear distinction between product and process
R&D is difficult, even more so in the case of fundamental research and future
applications.
Furthermore, the model considers an aggregate of manufactures and evaluates the
optimum quality level by means of real income. Because of the macroeconomic
perspective of this paper, an individual perception of quality is neglected. Thus, the
argumentation of social welfare is not less a matter of the consumer’s preferences but
rather of income and employment effects. Finally, the results differ with respect to
variations in market structure and partial analysis[20].
In the face of the underlying assumptions, the model neglects two important issues.
First, the paper does not include R&D cooperations among (manufacturing) firms due
to the non-strategic Dixit-Stiglitz settings. Second, it may be interesting to consider
spillover effects. In this context, the quality of a particular firm i is not only dependent
on the input of its own research input, uiðLRi Þ, but also on the R&D efforts of the whole
sector: uiðLRi ;
Pn
j¼1L
R
j Þ. Including both sources of market failure, increasing returns
Figure 4.
Technological potential
(required tax) and welfare
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and (positive) externalities, would produce allocation outcomes differing from the
results presented in this paper. Nonetheless, they may expand political options and
open up combinations of regulation instruments.
Notes
1. Data source: EUROSTAT database, Eurostat (2008), newly acceded countries not included.
2. The distinction between product and process innovation follows the definitions of the Oslo
Manual (Eurostat and OECD (2005)).
3. See Skinner (1986) and Rothschild (1987).
4. Furthermore, product differentiation is formalized by the Goods Characteristics approach, as
pioneered by Lancaster (1966). See Tirole (1988, Ch. 2).
5. Henceforth, the traditional sector is treated as the numeraire.
6. The functional form of the subutility is based upon the numerical example of Sutton (1991, p.
48 et seq.).
7. Sutton (1991) assumes a minimum product quality of 1, even if no research is undertaken.
For analytical convenience, we simplify this proposition.
8. In fact, instead of considering an autonomous sector, it may be possible to regard R&D as an
in-house process of the manufacturing industry that is staffed from a particular labor
market.
9. The firm size in the present model is times the term in brackets higher than the firm size of
the original Dixit-Stiglitz model.
10. The polynomial (25) has a pole at u ¼ ½g 2sFðsg2 mÞ=m 2ðg2 1Þ1=g, which is always
below the equilibrium value (22).
11. See Neary (2001).
12. Alternatively, the profit function may be plotted with respect to firm number, which yields a
monotonously decreasing hyperbola intersecting zero-profits at the equilibrium firm
number. A firm number higher (lower) than this point implies negative (positive) profits, and
thus, market exits (entries).
13. Rearranging equation (2) provides an expression for x.
14. In this section, the superscript, e, denotes the market equilibrium outcome, * the first-best
and * * the second-best values, respectively.
15. This complies with the welfare results of the Dixit-Stiglitz model. See the introduction of
Brakman and Heijdra (2004, p. 19 et seq.), for instance.
16. We neglect the term mmð12 mÞ12m.
17. If ðg2 1=gÞ , ðs2 1=mÞ holds, the domain of r is: 0;m=s2 m½ due to a negative root. The
upper limit is greater than the equilibrium cost rate without regulation so that it is not a part
of the total (piecewise-defined) welfare function (33) and (35).
18. It follows from the second resource constraint in equation (29) implying perfect competition
in the research market that the research cost rate is the same for equilibrium and first-best
solution: r e ¼ r* .
19. The same implications hold, if we assume an R&D subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax on
household income.
20. See, e.g. Symeonidis (2003).
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